Json Web Tokens are all the rage lately. They are lauded as being a stateless alternative to server-side cookies and as the perfect way to use authentication in your single-page app and some people also sell them as a work around for the EU cookie policy because, you know, they work without cookies too.
If you ask me though, I would always recommend against the use of JWT to solve your problem.
Let me give you a few arguments to debunk, from worse to better:
Debunking arguments
It requires no cookies
General “best” practice stores JWT in the browsers local storage and then sends that off to the server in all authenticated API calls.
This is no different from a traditional cookie with the exception that transmission to the server isn’t done automatically by the browsers (which a cookie would be) and that it is significantly less secure than a cookie: As there is no way to set a value in local storage outside of JavaScript, there consequently is no feature equivalent to cookies’ httponly. This means that XSS vulnerabilities in your frontend now give an attacker access to the JWT token.
Worse, as people often use JWT for both a short-lived and a refresh token, this means that any XSS vulnerability now gives the attacker to a valid refresh token that can be used to create new session tokens at-will, even when your session has expired, in the process completely invalidating all the benefits of having separate refresh and access tokens.
“But at least I don’t need to display one of those EU cookie warnings” I hear you say. But did you know that the warning is only required for tracking cookies? Cookies that are required for the operation of your site (so a traditional session cookie) don’t require you to put up that warning in the first place.
It’s stateless
This is another often used argument in favour of JWT: Because the server can put all the required state into them, there’s no need to store any thing on the server end, so you can load-balance incoming requests to whatever app server you want and you don’t need any central store for session state.
In general, that’s true, but it becomes an issue once you need to revoke or refresh tokens.
JWT is often used in conjunction with OAuth where the server issues a relatively short-lived access token and a longer-lived refresh token.
If a client wants to refresh its access token, it’s using its refresh token to do so. The server will validate that and then hand out a new access token.
But for security reasons, you don’t want that refresh token to be re-used (otherwise, a leaked refresh token could be used to gain access to the site for its whole validity period) and you probably also want to invalidate the previously used access token otherwise, if that has leaked, it could be used until its expiration date even though the legitimate client has already refreshed it.
So you need a means to black-list tokens.
Which means you’re back at keeping track of state because that’s the only way to do this. Either you black-list the whole binary representation of the token, or you put some unique ID in the token and then blacklist that (and compare after decoding the token), but what ever you do, you still need to keep track of that shared state.
And once you’re doing that, you lose all the perceived advantages of statelessness.
Worse: Because the server has to invalidate and blacklist both access and refresh token when a refresh happens, a connection failure during a refresh can leave a client without a valid token, forcing users to log in again.
In todays world of mostly mobile clients using the mobile phone network, this happens more often than you’d think. Especially as your access tokens should be relatively short-lived.
It’s better than rolling your own crypto
In general, yes, I agree with that argument. Anything is better than rolling your own crypto. But are you sure your library of choice has implemented the signature check and decryption correctly? Are you keeping up to date with security flaws in your library of choice (or its dependencies).
You know what is still better than using existing crypto? Using no crypto what so ever. If all you hand out to the client to keep is a completely random token and all you do is look up the data assigned to that token, then there’s no crypto anybody could get wrong.
A solution in search of a problem
So once all good arguments in favour of JWT have dissolved, you’re left with all their disadvantages:
- By default, the JWT spec allows for insecure algorithms and key sizes. It’s up to you to chose safe parameters for your application
- Doing JWT means you’re doing crypto and you’re decrypting potentially hostile data. Are you up to this additional complexity compared to a single primary key lookup?
- JWTs contain quite a bit of metadata and other bookkeeping information. Transmitting this for every request is more expensive than just transmitting a single ID.
- It’s brittle: Your application has to make sure to never make a request to the server without the token present. Every AJAX request your frontend makes needs to manually append the token and as the server has to blacklist both access and refresh tokens whenever they are used, you might accidentally end up without a valid token when the connection fails during refresh.
So are they really useless?
Even despite all these negative arguments, I think that JWT are great for one specific purpose and that’s authentication between different services in the backend if the various services can’t trust each other.
In such a case, you can use very short-lived tokens (with a lifetime measured in seconds at most) and you never have them leave your internal network. All the clients ever see is a traditional session-cookie (in case of a browser-based frontend) or a traditional OAuth access token.
This session cookie or access token is checked by frontend servers (which, yes, have to have access to some shared state, but this isn’t an unsolvable issue) which then issue the required short-lived JW tokens to talk to the various backend services.
Or you use them when you have two loosely coupled backend services who trust each other and need to talk to each other. There too, you can issue short-lived tokens (given you are aware of above described security issues).
In the case of short-lived tokens that never go to the user, you circumvent most of the issues outlined above: They can be truly stateless because thank to their short lifetime, you don’t ever need to blacklist them and they can be stored in a location that’s not exposed to possible XSS attacks against your frontend.
This just leaves the issue of the difficult-to-get-right crypto, but as you never accept tokens from untrusted sources, a whole class of possible attacks becomes impossible, so you might even get away with not updating on an too-regular basis.
So, please, when you are writing your next web API that uses any kind of authentication and you ask yourself “should I use JWT for this”, resist the temptation. Using plain opaque tokens is always better when you talk to an untrusted frontend.
Only when you are working on scaling our your application and splitting it out into multiple disconnected microservices and you need a way to pass credentials between them, then by all means go ahead and investigate JWT – it’ll surely be better than cobbling something up for yourself.
gnegg 